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THE FEAR-CAUSING COMMISSION AND ITS
REIGN OF TERROR: EXAMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FCC'S
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE SPEECH UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. A CONTROVERSY IS BORN
"So the FCC won't let me be or let me be me so let me see, they tried
to shut me down on MTV.. . . Now this looks like a job for me, so
everybody just follow me, cuz we need a little controversy, cuz it feels so
empty without me," sings the infamous rapper Eminem. 1 Eminem was
neither the first nor the last person to languish under the Federal
Communication Commission's ("FCC") orders cracking down on indecent
speech and obscenity in broadcast.
The FCC has continued to tighten the reigns over the years,
indiscriminately attacking the entire spectrum of broadcasters-small and
large alike. The agency slapped Infinity Broadcasting and its owner Clear
Channel with fines nearing $2,000,000 for indecent speech by radio
personalities like Howard Stem for violating its orders.2 CBS incurred
more than $500,000 in fines for what the FCC called Janet Jackson's
"wardrobe malfunction," when her breast was exposed for less than one
second during the live broadcast of the 2004 Super Bowl Half Time show.
3
The media has provided extensive coverage of these occurrences and
keeps the public well-informed about the fines levied against large
broadcasters, but there are several lesser-known people and broadcasters
that suffer in silence. For example, DJ Host Elliot Segal's 4 broadcast faced
nearly $250,000 in fines for casually using the words "do it" in reference to
1. EMINEM, Without Me, on THE EMINEM SHOW (Aftermathlnterscope Records 2002).
2. See Frank Ahrens, Deal Erases Pending Charges Against Clear Channel, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2004, at C04.
3. John Canpanelli, Broadcast Snooze, PLAIN DEALER REP. (Cleveland), July 4, 2004, at
LI.
4. Elliot Segal is a radio DJ that hosts the show "Elliot in the Morning" in Washington
State.
108 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:107
sexual intercourse.5 DJ Host, Bubba the Love Sponge, 6 "lost his job after
the FCC hit his Tampa radio station with a huge fine for obscenity
violations."7
Large broadcasters such as CBS have indicated their intent to
challenge the fines levied against them.8 However, despite these potential
challenges, and because of the FCC's growing control, broadcasters have
seen no choice but to self-censor. 9 In fact, broadcasters recently toyed with
the idea of creating a voluntary code of conduct.10 Sadly, even media
moguls with the financial capacity to challenge these decisions have settled
with the FCC, while protesting that some of their broadcasts were not
indecent."
The FCC imposes fines based on regulations enacted in a reactive
manner. 2 Currently, the law-making process begins when the agency
awakes from its slumber after an individual or a group complains about
some type of personally offensive content on the radio or television.
13
Then, a panel of five appointed members usually responds to the complaint
by issuing a regulatory order. 14 Subsequently, if a broadcaster or another
party is unhappy with the agency's new regulation or decision, that
broadcaster or party may challenge the order in federal court and eventually
may seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.' 5 If the Supreme Court agrees
to review the decision, it should apply the strict scrutiny standard in
examining the FCC's regulation, provided this regulation affects First
Amendment speech rights.'
6
5. Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 22, 2004).
6. See Patrick Goldstein, A Parent Who Said 'Enough,' L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at El
(The FCC charged Clear Channel in excess of $700,000 for indecent sexual speech in response to
a single complaint by a father not wanting his teenage son to be exposed to Bubba the Love
Sponge's broadcasts).
7. Deborah Norville Tonight (MSNBC television broadcast Aug. 17, 2004).
8. See Ahrens, supra note 2, at C04 (stating that Viacom president "has vowed to fight the
pending indecency fines against its stations... ").
9. Christian Toto, Tuning Into TV., WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at B06.
10. Andrew Mollison, Feds Push For Code of Airwaves Decency, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 1, 2004, at IE.
11. See Ahrens, supra note 2, at C04 (stating that Clear Channel settled for a record 1.75
million dollars over FCC indecency violations though disagreeing with the FCC).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(a), (i) (2000).
15. See generally Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1989)
(discussing one broadcaster's challenging of an FCC regulation and asking for review by the
Supreme Court).
16. Id. at 126 (showing that the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the FCC's
regulation of sexually explicit speech because it was protected by the First Amendment).
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The FCC seems to issue and review new regulations in an efficient,
clock-work-like process. However, its review process defies the principle
of separation of powers, and chills society and broadcasters' sacred
constitutional right to free speech.' 7  This is because the regulations
suppress broadcast programming that is presumably reflective of society's
ideas and thoughts. In the modem world of broadcasting, radio
personalities, media moguls, and programmers share common fears about
incurring fines and citations for programming content violations.'
8
Consequently, they respond to the FCC's actions by delaying live
television,' 9 cutting programs, and firing individuals who create the
questionable programs.2 ° When broadcasters or other harmed individuals
attempt to challenge the decision, the courts apply a standard of review that
masquerades as strict scrutiny, but instead affords excessive deference to
the FCC.2'
Since the FCC's inception, broadcasters and third parties have
unsuccessfully used traditional First Amendment arguments to challenge
the constitutionality of the agency's broad regulatory power.22 The
constitutional debate was recently revived in response to the FCC's
renewed campaign to punish all broadcasters attempting to skirt its
indecency boundaries.23 Despite the fact that broadcasters have always
enjoyed the benefit of strict scrutiny and the opportunities to challenge new
fines and regulations, the FCC's campaign creates a continually darkening
cloud over the First Amendment. A reactive law-making process, coupled
with the Supreme Court's deferential standard of review, leaves
broadcasters unclear about the type of programming that will keep them off
the FCC's radar.
The FCC's process of passing regulations that affect First
Amendment rights must be reexamined and altered. The current method
threatens the checks and balances essential to the governmental system, and
stifles the fundamental right of free speech protected by the Constitution.
This Comment examines the FCC's power over First Amendment freedom
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. Christian Toto, Tuning Into T. V., WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at B06. Sadly, this
defeats the entire concept of live television, as it destroys the spontaneity, energy and excitement
of a live broadcast.
20. See Norville, supra note 7.
21. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1574 (2005).
22. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1988). These traditional challenges generally attack the over-breadth or vagueness of a statute.
Id. at 1335.
23. See infra Part II.C.
2005l
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of speech to emphasize the need to reform the agency's law-making
processes to include greater caution and restraint in the creation of
regulations affecting constitutional rights. Part II provides a historical
analysis of the FCC's creation and its growing authority to regulate
broadcasting content. Part III examines the inefficacy of past First
Amendment challenges of FCC actions. Part IV proposes both a judicial
and a legislative solution. First, the federal courts should allow
broadcasters to make a novel constitutional challenge under the Non-
Delegation Doctrine. Second, this Comment proposes that Congress
amend the Telecommunications Act to institute a bifurcated system of
passing new regulations. This system should distinguish between those
regulations that affect constitutional rights and those that do not. The
former would require more careful consideration than the latter. Part V
suggests that the legislative solution is preferable to the judicial one. A
new bifurcated legislative process is not only desirable but necessary to
preserve both the fundamental right to free speech and the delicate balance
of powers upon which our federal government stands.
II. CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESENCE: THE FCC'S GROWTH OF
POWER IN REGULATING INDECENCY AND OBSCENITY
A. The Creation of the FCC and Its Powers to Regulate Broadcast Media
The FCC was previously the Federal Radio Commission, which was
created by the Federal Radio Commission Act of 1927 to regulate radio
broadcast in the interest of public necessity.24 This Act was passed with the
purpose of emphasizing the public's interest in communication instead of
focusing on individual interests. Within a short period of time, Congress
determined that the new agency required broader authority.26 Through the
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-84 (1927) (repealed 1934).
25. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927) (establishing the
Federal Radio Commission, which regulated broadcast as required by "public convenience,
interest, or necessity"); see also 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (statement of Sen. White) (stating
that the Radio Act of 1927 focuses on the public's rights over the rights of any individual).
26. See 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000) (stating the FCC's purpose is "regulating interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible,
to all the people of the United States ... a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the
national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire
and radio communications, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this
policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting
additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio
communication ... ").
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Communications Act of 1934,27 Congress renamed and expanded its
original creation, calling the successor the Federal Communications
Commission.28 Congress granted this agency sweeping powers to regulate
radio, interstate telephone, and telegraph communications,29 with the
ambiguous guidelines of serving "public convenience, interest, [and]
necessity. '30  In addition, section 303(r) of the Communications Act
provides that the "Commission from time to time, as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires, shall... [m]ake such rules and regulations
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act] .... 31
Thus, Congress created the FCC and entrusted it with great law-
making power but gave it very few law-making guidelines. This broad
power has given the FCC a set of powerful tools to control the entire
content of American broadcast media: it can issue an order redirecting the
content of broadcasts,32 levy fines or sanctions for violations of these
orders, 33 suspend broadcasting licenses, 34 and deny new licenses for prior
indecency violations.
35
The FCC is directed by five commissioners who are appointed by the
President and approved by the Senate. 36  "['N]o more than three
Commissioners can be members of the same political party, 3 7 and "[t]he
Commissioners' terms are staggered., 38 As a federal regulatory agency,
Congress gave the FCC broad legislative functions.39 "The FCC enforces
the Communications Act, adopts and enforces administrative rules ... and
performs research concerning the broadcast industry.' 4°  Among other
things, the FCC has issued regulations that determine what kind of content
can be transmitted during radio broadcasts, and has issued several
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (2000); Seth T. Goldsamt, Comment, "Crucified by the
FCC? " Howard Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 203,
207 (1995).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 303, 303(r) (2000).
32. See id.
33. Id. § 502 (2000).
34. Id. § 303(m)(1).
35. Id. § 309(k).
36. Id. § 154(a).
37. Goldsamt, supra note 29, at 208 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5)).
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regulatory decisions governing the broadcast industry, including what time
of day indecent shows can be aired.4'
The FCC's procedural manual says that the FCC's duty is to "address
concerns of the entire community, 42 and it has the power to conduct
investigations and inquiries. 3  Contrary to this directive, the FCC only
takes a reactive stance.44  The agency responds to individual listener
complaints, instead of undertaking its own independent investigations into
the public's desire and tolerance for broadcasting content.45 This reactive
law-making process is in direct contradiction to the FCC's original
purpose-to protect the interests of society as a whole, rather than those of
a disgruntled individual.46
B. The Evolution of the FCC's Regulation of Indecent and Obscene Speech
The broad power Congress delegated the FCC grants it immense
authority to restrict speech. The agency has also capitalized on the
ambiguity of modern definitions of obscenity and indecency. In 1948,
Congress enacted a statute that outlawed radio broadcasts of obscene
language.47 This statute enabled the FCC to fine and imprison those who
broadcast obscenity.48 However, prior to this new legislation, Congress
was fully aware of the constitutional limitation on restricting speech. The
legislature made it clear that the FCC was not to censor the radio
airwaves, 49 since the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law.., abridging the freedom of speech. 50
41. See In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacific Found. Station WBAI, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98
(1975) (declaratory order).
42. Goldsamt, supra note 29, at 208.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 403 (2000) ("The Commission shall have full authority and power at any
time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing
concerning which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Commission by any
provision of this chapter, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions
of this chapter, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this chapter.").
44. See Goldsamt, supra note 29, at 208.
45. See id. at 208-09.
46. See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat 1162, 1163 (1927) (stating the
Commission's purpose as protecting the "public convenience, interest, or necessity").
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000).
48. Id.
49. 47 U.S.C § 326 (1988) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.").
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The statute presented the oxymoronic dilemma of prohibiting the
FCC from censoring speech while simultaneously requiring it to restrict
obscenity from broadcasts. A 1973 Supreme Court decision helped to
clarify this confusion. The Justices noted that speech could be divided into
two categories, and held that indecent speech would receive First
Amendment protection while obscene speech would not.51 The Supreme
Court in Miller v. California stated that something was obscene if "'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ... [or it]
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and.., lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 52
The Court has since held that obscenity does not deserve First
Amendment protection because the community should be able to determine
its own moral environment. 3 Legal author Henry Clor stated that
obscenity should be excluded from First Amendment protection because
the "ethical convictions of social man do not simply rest upon his explicit
opinions. They rest also upon a delicate network of moral and aesthetic
feelings .... Men whose sensibilities are frequently assaulted by prurient
and lurid impressions may become desensitized .... This is what is meant
by an erosion of the moral fabric.
' 54
In contrast, indecent speech receives First Amendment protection;
therefore, the government cannot suppress it simply because others might
find it offensive.55 The Supreme Court held that there is a critical
distinction between indecency and obscenity, but Americans remained
befuddled as to the distinction. The difference appears to be a matter of
degree, and it is precisely within these shades of gray that the FCC dwells,
terrorizing the broadcasting community.
The FCC has exploited the ambiguities in the Supreme Court's
definitions of both obscenity and indecency, often arbitrarily labeling
certain language obscene to justify censoring programming. After a
thorough examination of FCC orders, it will become clear that the agency
51. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding that "obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment").
52. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
53. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1019 (2001) (citing Paris Adult
Theatre I. v. Slaton, 418 U.S. 939 (1974)).
54. Id. (quoting HENRY CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 170-71 (1969)).
55. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("The ability of government, consonant
with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other
words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.").
2005]
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has taken advantage of the holes in the Supreme Court's decisions. The
agency has become more strict and arbitrary in its regulations, and
consequently has taken more control over speech than the First
Amendment, properly construed, allows.
C. From Then Until Now
Since the Miller decision, the FCC has continued to create
inconsistent, reactive regulatory orders that expand the definition of
indecency and further restrict the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.
In 1972, the FCC issued a regulatory order in response to a single
complaint made by a radio listener about a George Carlin broadcast. 56At
about two o'clock in the afternoon, Carlin joked about the "seven dirty
words" that are never heard on public radio waves.5 7 One displeased dad
complained to the FCC about the language, stating that it was inappropriate
for his child, who was riding in the car with him during the broadcast.58
This troublesome incident continues to fuel the current controversy and
exemplifies the FCC's reactive process.
Reacting to this sole complaint, the FCC issued a declaratory order
without conducting any independent investigations. In the order, entitled
FCC v. Pacifica, the FCC found the language from the broadcast indecent
59
and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.60 The order 6' defined indecency as
language that "describes in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, when there is a reasonable risk that children
may be in the audience. 62 Here the FCC began exploiting semantic shades
of gray, as the agency never specifically defined the phrase "contemporary
community standards, 6 3 which it borrowed from the Supreme Court's
decision in Miller.
64
Not only has the FCC adopted a problematic approach to regulating
56. See Goldsamt, supra note 29, at 211.
57. Id.
58. Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94.
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.").
61. See Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94.
62. Id. at 98 (This definition was remarkably similar to the Supreme Court's definition of
"obscenity," appearing to allow the FCC to only impose restrictions on obscene materials.).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 94.
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indecency and obscenity, but it has also failed to adhere to a consistent
definition of both terms. For nine years following Pacifica, the FCC
slammed broadcasters with indecency violations only when they used the
"seven dirty words," or those similar to the cursed seven, because the
decision in Pacifica seemed confined to specific facts.65  However,
throughout the 1980s, the conservative Reagan administration incited a
regulatory crackdown on indecency. 66  It abolished67 the "seven dirty
words" standard in favor of the generic definition 68 the FCC originally
provided in Pacifica, but never applied.69 From then on, the definition of
indecency began to expand, encompassing all questionable language aired
on the radio.
Having backpedaled from the "seven dirty words" standard in favor
of its more contemporary definition, the FCC released three more orders in
1987 supporting its broader standard of indecency.70  In Infinity
Broadcasting Corp v. FCC, the FCC found portions of Howard Stem's
broadcasts indecent, although there was no use of the "seven dirty
words.' 1  In another example of its inconsistent approach, the FCC
declared its intent to regulate excerpts from an on-air theatrical play
broadcast between 10:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.7 2  This was in direct
contradiction to its prior rule that broadcasts aired after 10:00 P.M. would
not be subject to the indecency regulations.73 Also in contradiction, the
FCC decided to regulate airplay of a song, "Makin' Bacon," on a Saturday
night after 9:30 P.M.
74
65. In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) [hereinafter Infinity 11]; see also
Action For The Children's Television v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 852 F.2d 1332, 1336
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
66. President Regan was ultra-conservative and the FCC in turn became more conservative
under his term of office.
67. In re The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2704 (1987).
68. See Infinity II, supra note 65 at 930 (defining indecency as language that "describes in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs, when there is a reasonable risk that children
may be in the audience.").
69. Id.
70. See In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987) [hereinafter Infinity 1]; In
re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987) [hereinafter Pacifica 11]; In re The Regents 2
F.C.C.R. at 2703.
71. Infinity I, supra note 70, at 2705.
72. See Pacifca II, supra note 70, at 2698.
73. Id.
74. In re The Regents, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2703 (The song by the band Pork Dukes was played on
a college station, KCSP-FM. The song lyrics were as follows: "Makin' bacon, makin'
bacon... A ten-inch cropper with a varicose vein... Come here baby, make it quick, kneel
down... Turn around baby, let me take you from behind, Makin' bacon is on my mind.").
20051
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Shortly thereafter, the FCC summarized these released orders to
inform broadcasters of the new standards and broader definition of
indecency.75 The guidelines did not establish a clear rule, but the agency
"suggested" that a "safe harbor" for "dirty" broadcasts might be between
midnight and 6:00 A.M., to insure that the material was targeted at adults
instead of children.76
Infinity Broadcasting fell victim to the FCC's imprecise summary of
the new regulations released in 1987. In 1988, Infinity's stations were
heavily fined for Howard Stem's programs.77 Infinity challenged the order,
arguing that the FCC must treat similarly situated parties in a similar
manner, as a D.C. Court had previously instructed in Melody Music v. Fed.
Communications Commission.7 8 Despite the court's holding, the FCC did
not fine another broadcasting company named Sagittarius under the same
standard, even though a complaint was also filed against its television
broadcast entitled Geraldo.79  Like Stem, Geraldo explicitly discussed
various sexual techniques.8 0 However, the FCC authorized itself to infer
the Geraldo show's purpose-that, unlike the content of Howard Stem's
program, it never intended to "pander or titillate," and was not "vulgar or
lewd., 81 The FCC's rationale was simply illogical. Instead of applying a
uniform standard, the FCC chose to give the same words or sexual content
different meanings. This inconsistency again demonstrates the FCC's
unfettered discretion in defining obscenity in broadcasting content.
More recently, the FCC expanded its authority to regulate speech by
redefining indecency to include the broader notion of profanity. Bono, the
lead singer of U2, said, "[t]his is really, really fucking brilliant" when
receiving an award during the 2003 Golden Globe Awards broadcast.82 In
October of 2003, the FCC Enforcement Bureau decided that this utterance
was "unfortunate," but not indecent, because it was used in an exclamatory
fashion, rather than describing sexual or excretory functions.83 But the
following year, after the breast exposure incident with Janet Jackson on
75. See New Indecency Enforcement Standards to Be Applied to All Broadcast and
Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987).
76. See Infinity II, supra note 65, at 937.
77. See In re Liab. of Sagittarius Broad., 7 F.C.C.R. 6873, 6873 (1992).
78. See generally Melody Music v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
79. See Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6874.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Lisa Davis & Kesari Ruza, The New Indecency Law Landscape, 50 PRAC. LAW. No. 5,
Oct. 2004, at 27, 29.
83. See id.
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CBS, 84 the FCC issued a new order 85 overruling its prior decision about
Bono's statement. 86 It also indicated the agency's resolve to embark on a
"new approach to profanity" 87 that no longer limited the statutory meaning
of the term "profane language" 88 to "blasphemy or divine imprecation," but
instead expanded the definition to cover words such as "fuck" and other
odious variations. 89 In the end, the FCC essentially granted itself additional
means of suppressing the First Amendment-instead of merely patrolling
the established road of indecency, it could now explore the new avenue of
profanity.
D. Today's Omniscient FCC
Currently, the law prohibits broadcasting indecent material from 6:00
A.M. to 10:00 P.M., as children are presumably listening at this time.90 If a
station violates this regulation, it can be subject to a fine of $32,500 per
utterance. Stations may face multiple fines for repeatedly broadcasting the
indecency, with a cap of $325,000. 91 (Impending legislation proposes an
increase of up to $250,000 per violation with a $3,000,000 per day cap.).
92
The FCC maintains a reactive stance because it insists on relying
solely upon listener complaints to issue decisions, instead of proactively
setting comprehensive standards.93 By also penalizing both intentional and
unintentional violations, the agency essentially prohibits live broadcasting.
As a result, stations are understandably more reluctant to broadcast live
coverage, and are instituting delays when covering live events.9" These
delays prevent the station from being fined, for example, when a rioter on
television yells an expletive at police officers.
84. See supra Part I.
85. See In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 04-43, File No.
EB-03-IH-01 10 (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes], available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2004/FCC-04- 43Al.html.
86. See Davis, supra note 82, at 29.
87. Golden Globes, supra note 85, 115.
88. See 18 US.C. § 1464 (2000) (providing that "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.").
89. Golden Globes, supra note 85, 14.
90. See Regents, supra note 70, at 2704.
91. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b) (2004).
92. See Davis, supra note 82, at 28.
93. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) [hereinafter Pacifica 1]
(discussing the FCC's decision based on a single complaint by a father whose young child heard
an allegedly offensive radio broadcast).
94. See Toto, supra note 9.
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Shows such as Howard Stem have been pulled,95 and the FCC
attempted to withhold granting further licenses to those responsible for
airing the program. 96  The FCC has even tried to deny renewal of
broadcasting licenses for other reasons.97 As though this was not enough,
the FCC has also toyed with "the idea of extending its decency standards to
cable television."
98
Several obvious questions arise as a result of the FCC's regulatory
practices. First, did Congress intend for the FCC to regulate live television
so heavily as to practically require broadcasters to put at least a five-second
delay in live broadcasts99 to prevent mishaps like Ms. Jackson's? Second,
did the Supreme Court in Pacifica intend for broadcasters to start pulling00
or self-censoring' 0 ' programs in fear that they might somehow violate
indecency standards? Finally, did the Framers intend for the First
Amendment to be so degraded? The simple answer to these questions is
no. The FCC must be restrained so that the First Amendment may regain
meaning in the broadcast media context.
III. THE OBSEQUIOUS JUDICIAL BRANCH
From the beginning of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
jumped into bed with the FCC and has since stayed under the covers. This
arrangement makes challenging FCC orders practically impossible.
Broadcasters have continuously tried to challenge regulatory orders under
95. Frank Ahrens, Deal Erases Pending Charges Against Clear Channel, WASH POST. June
10, 2004 at C04.
96. See Editorial, How Much Power for FCC?, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 21.
97. See Tony Snow, Government by Ukase; Reliance on Rules Undermines Democracy,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12, 1997, at 29A; Linda P. Campbell, FCC rules GIJoe, He-Man
OK TV Advertising Limits Don't Apply to Toy-Based Shows, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1991, at 5.
98. John Campanelli, Broadcast Snooze, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 4, 2004, at L1.
99. See Joanne Ostrow, A Lifetime of Debate in Five Seconds: Questions over Indecency
Raise Profile of TV Censors, DENV. POST, Apr. 19, 2004, at A-1. (Several broadcasters are so
worried about FCC fines that they are using time delays even though the broadcasts are supposed
to be live. For example, ABC used an audio delay for the Oscars to cut anything "untoward."
MTV plans to use a delay for their MTV Music Awards and CBS plans to use delays for future
coverage of NFL events.).
100. See Campanelli, supra note 98, at Li.
101. Tony Mauro, Stern's Raunch is Better than Silence, USA TODAY, May 12, 2004, at
13A ("Public broadcasters told the FCC recently that 'we have been forced, at increased expense,
to provide multiple nationwide feeds of programs that would have been unthinkable to edit only
weeks ago.' Case in point: deleting strong language in the popular Masterpiece Theatre series
from Britain, Prime Suspect. 'I have given up on PBS,' one angry viewer wrote in to protest the
self-censorship. When Americans are becoming more prudish than the Brits, we are truly in
trouble.").
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the First Amendment using the traditional doctrines of over-breadth and
vagueness. 102 The courts have adopted a highly deferential version of strict
scrutiny review, instead of looking at FCC regulations with a truly critical
eye. A thorough examination of case development shows that this type of
constitutional challenge has been entirely ineffective due to the judiciary's
excessively deferential approach to the issue.
The Supreme Court has contributed to the ambiguity and confusion
by supporting inconsistent and unclear definitions of indecency. The
indecency doctrine began its journey through the courts in 1971, when the
Supreme Court held in Cohen v. California that profane and offensive
language was protected by the First Amendment. 0 3  In Cohen, the
defendant was convicted of violating a "disturbing the peace" statute for
entering a Los Angeles County Courthouse in a jacket with the words
"Fuck the Draft" printed on the back. 10 4 Since the words neither appealed
to the prurient interest, nor were communicated to people in a captive
audience,10 5 the speech was held to be protected.10 6  Yet Cohen never
expounded upon the amount of constitutional protection indecent speech
was to be afforded, for the speech in this case was also political in nature.
As a result, political speech often receives a very high level of
constitutional protection, irrespective of whether indecent in nature or
not. 107
102. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (discussing how broadcasters and the ACLU challenged FCC indecency standards as vague
and overbroad).
103. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). In this case, the defendant walked
through the courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" to express
his thoughts on the Vietnam War. He was convicted of disturbing the peace under a California
statute that sought to punish offensive conduct. The state argued that his conduct was his
communication on the back of his jacket. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to suppress freedom of speech.
The Court also said that Cohen's speech had an element of "political discourse," and thus was
subject to fewer governmental restraints. "The ability of government, consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections." Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 16 (noting that women and children were present in the courthouse, which
evidences the ancient mindset that exposing women and children to bad language was somehow
worse than exposing men to the same language).
105. Id. at 21. The terms "captive audience" or "unavoidable exposure" are usually used to
describe an audience that cannot escape the speech in some manner. In this case, the audience
was not captive because they could avert their eyes, or leave the courthouse.
106. Id. at 26.
107. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-11 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection");
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The Court became even more aligned with the FCC's position on
broadcast regulations. It quickly began chipping away at the First
Amendment, making it clear that indecent speech was not to be afforded
full First Amendment protection. For example, in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, the Court held that sexually explicit films merited less protection
than political discourse, and could thus be regulated to a greater extent.
0 8
Similarly, the City of Detroit passed an ordinance to reduce the
concentration of adult entertainment movie theaters present in any
particular zone of the city.'09  The Court decided that although the
ordinance technically regulated speech content, it did not violate the First
Amendment because, while the First Amendment safeguards
communication in the area of sexually oriented materials from total
suppression, "the State may legitimately use the content of these materials
as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion
pictures."" l0 Here, the Court again shied away from issuing a definition of
indecency, instead deferring to another entity in order to make the
determination. As a result, broadcasters remained in the dark about the
changing standards of indecency.
The Court's willingness to defer to the FCC's judgment was
cemented in the 1978 landmark Pacifica decision."' This decision quickly
became the shield behind which the Court still hides today whenever it is
asked to examine a constitutional challenge to an FCC regulatory order. In
Pacifica, the Court upheld the FCC's declaratory order that labeled a
George Carlin broadcast indecent." 2 The Supreme Court stated two central
purposes for allowing indecency regulation by the FCC: (1) the regulation
furthered the government's purpose of protecting children from indecent
programming,' 3 and (2) the broadcast media must be highly regulated
because of a limited number of frequencies of airwaves and its "uniquely
pervasive" ability to enter into the homes of the public and to reach
children. 1 4  In addition, the Court noted that the FCC could regulate
indecent broadcast material despite concerns about restrictions of the First
Amendment because listeners could always access the material through
Eu v. S. F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)) (stating that "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and
most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.").
108. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).
109. Id. at 52.
110. Id. at 70-1.
111. See Pacifica 1, 438 U.S. 726.
112. Id. at 732.
113. See id. at 749.
114. See id. at 748.
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obtaining a written transcript of the show or by attending a live
performance.' 15 Here, instead of considering whether the material was
indecent and contrary to the ideals of the "contemporary community
standards," ' 16 the Court simply looked in the FCC's direction and nodded
approvingly. The Court jumped to the conclusion that protecting children
is a compelling purpose and felt a more complete review was
superfluous. 17 The problem is that, although the Court found a justifiable
compelling purpose, it neglected to thoroughly examine whether the
restrictions were narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, thus brushing
past the other requirements of strict scrutiny and relaxing the supposed
rigid standard.
Ever since that decision, the Supreme Court's rationale of protecting
children has built an impenetrable wall that makes any traditional First
Amendment challenge to FCC regulatory orders futile. For example, in
Action for Children's Television v. FCC,1 8 the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") challenged the definition of indecency as
unconstitutionally vague and over-broad." 9 The court upheld the FCC's
decision and its new broad standard for indecency, 120 saying the "seven
dirty words" standard was too narrow 121 to effectively "shelter children
from exposure to words and phrases their parents regard as inappropriate
for them to hear."'122 In addition, the Court conceded that the new standard
was highly cryptic and vague, attributing this characteristic to the fact that
the regulation of indecency itself was inherently ambiguous. 23 The Court
discarded the over-breadth argument by stating that it did not foresee the
new definition of indecency to have any chilling effect on broadcasters.
124
Though the Supreme Court will typically engage in a thorough discussion
of whether a statute or regulation is over-encompassing or too vague to
serve its purpose, the Court devoted the bulk of this opinion to justifying
why the FCC should be allowed to maintain a vague and over-broad
definition. Thus the Supreme Court continued its increasing deference to
115. Id. at 760.
116. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
117. See Pacifica I, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
118. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 1334.
120. See id. at 1338 (showing it is hard to keep track, but the indecency standard at this time
is the more generic version that was in place after the "seven dirty words" standard was redacted).
121. Id. at 1338.
122. Id. at 1340.
123. Id. at 1338.
124. See Action, 852 F.2d at 1339 n.10 (citing Justice Powell's concurrence in Pacifica 1).
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the FCC in this area of law.
125
Since then, broadcasters have consistently tried to challenge FCC
orders claiming that the regulations are an unconstitutional suppression of
their First Amendment rights, but the Court today still clings to the idea
that the crusade against indecency is in the name of children.
IV. FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE ABYSS
A. Reviving the Non-Delegation Doctrine: The Judicial Solution
When a First Amendment right is at issue, a regulatory body must
carefully weigh the interest in restricting controversial speech against the
value of allowing the controversial speech to be broadcasted. Carefully
crafted regulations may restrict radio broadcasters' speech for compelling
purposes because of the nature of the medium. However, while speech
may be restricted, it should not be devalued to the extent that it has been
under the current FCC review system. Whether or not indecency standards
are to become looser or stricter, the process by which those regulations are
passed must be revised to obliterate the excessive judicial and
congressional deference currently afforded to the FCC. A revision of this
process will ultimately help to preserve the sanctity of the First
Amendment. The question remains as to how to accomplish that goal.
Broadcasters have virtually exhausted all of their traditional First
Amendment arguments. They need an innovative approach that both forces
more meaningful guidelines upon the FCC while remaining good for
children. A novel approach would be to challenge the scope of the FCC
orders by arguing that the FCC's actions violate the Non-Delegation
Doctrine. 126 Pursuing this constitutional approach should be more effective
in changing the current ambiguous regulations in favor of a more uniform
standard by which FCC regulations are reviewed.
An examination of the FCC's actions in light of the Non-Delegation
Doctrine will show that Congress must give the agency more direction and
guidelines when permitting it to impose restrictions on constitutionally
protected freedoms such as the right to free speech. The FCC clearly needs
far more "intelligible principles"' 127 from Congress in order to regulate this
area effectively within the bounds of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that Congress may not completely delegate
125. See id. at 1338-44.
126. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
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its lawmaking power to another branch of government, because Article I of
the United States Constitution "vests 'all' legislative power in
Congress." 128  This concept has been called the Non-Delegation
Doctrine. 129 However, this doctrine is partially a legal fiction because the
Court has upheld careless delegations without noting that they may cross
the constitutional line.'
30
The ease with which Congress began delegating power began in the
early 1930s. During this decade, President Franklin D. Roosevelt focused
his New Deal program on a highly regulated economy to heal the economic
ruin that ravaged the nation after the Great Depression. 31 Roosevelt's plan
gave birth to several federal agencies,132 whose purposes were to regulate
various specialized industries. It created agencies to restore the securities
market, to bolster agriculture, to ensure safety in the workplace, and to
stabilize the banking system. 133  Congress justified these delegations of
power to agencies as "necessary and proper" to the successful operation of
a properly functioning government. 134 The regulatory state grew, propelled
by increasingly complex societal needs and technological advances. With
this trend, the judicial branch became less and less suspicious of legislation
that supported socially progressive programs. 135
Though supportive, the Supreme Court did not approve the delegation
of power to an agency without some constraints on the agency's power.
3 6
Instead, the Court upheld delegation as long as Congress set forth "an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is
directed to conform . ,,137 However, this "intelligible principle" test
proved very easy to meet. 138  It has been satisfied, for example, where
128. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NATIONAL POWER
AND FEDERALISM, 273 (Aspen 3rd ed. 2004).
129. See id.
130. Reference.com, Definition of Legal Fiction, at
http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Legal fiction (defining legal fictions as "suppositions of
fact taken to be true by the courts of law, but which are not necessarily true. They typically are
done to evade archaic rules of procedure or to extend the jurisdiction of the courts in ways that
were considered useful, but not strictly authorized [sic] by the old rule.").
131. Sandra B. Zelhner, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 941, 955 (2000).
132. See id. at 942.
133. See id. at 955.
134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
135. See Zellmer, supra note 131, at 942.
136. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1928).
137. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
138. See May, supra note 124, at 273.
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Congress's guidance was as minimal as stating that the agency standards
must be "fair and equitable," or in the "public interest." 139 The Court's
consistent support for delegation of powers seems to reflect a realistic and
modem view of the separation of powers in the government. 140  More
specifically, Congress itself often "lacks the time and expertise" to issue
specified rules for many areas requiring in-depth and tailored legislation.'
41
It therefore makes sense for Congress to rely on the assistance of federal
agencies. 142 For example, an agency such as the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") is better equipped to conduct studies, lab tests, and gather
specific scientific data in order to pass environmental laws than is a busy
entity like Congress. Meanwhile, Congress can deal with more generalized
issues that do not require such particularized knowledge. This is also why
Congress granted the FCC such immense power over broadcasting. The
FCC has more time and resources to regulate the unique and highly
specialized field of broadcast. 1
43
At times, courts have taken the stance that Non-Delegation arguments
challenging the administrative state were "barely worthy of a footnote."'144
From the New Deal Era until the 1970s, the courts ignored Non-Delegation
concerns and upheld even the most ambiguous of provisions on the theory
that they could gain meaning "from the statute's overall purpose and
general philosophy, as well as its legislative history, factual background or
historical and social context."'' 45 For example, the FCC itself was let loose
with the broad and ambiguous, yet nonetheless "intelligible principle" that
it could regulate a broadcast as the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity" requires.
146
Although delegation is generally considered an efficient form of
government, some courts have shown hesitance in upholding it. Even if the
courts have not explicitly struck down laws as violating the Non-
Delegation Doctrine, the anti-delegation theme still runs throughout many
decisions. 147 For example, in 1935 the Supreme Court struck down two





143. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
144. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1284 n.17 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 823 n.8 (8th Cir. 1977)).
145. Zellmer, supra note 131, at 962.
146. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943).
147. See, e.g., Touby, supra note 137.
148. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (In this case,
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same year, the Court struck down another provision of the National
Industry Recovery Act ("NIRA") that enabled the President to stop the
transportation of petroleum in interstate commerce in excess of amounts
dictated by state law.
149
More importantly, in recent years some lower federal courts have
suggested that the Non-Delegation Doctrine is not entirely toothless. For
example in American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,150 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the EPA had overstepped its
constitutional boundaries and seized legislative powers from Congress
when it issued its National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS")
under the Clean Air Act.' 51 The Act required that the EPA set air standards
as a "requisite to protect public health" with an "adequate margin of
safety."15'  Additionally, the Act required secondary NAAQS to protect the
"public welfare,"'' 53 which generally includes effects on the environment as
well as "economic values.' 54  Even though the EPA consulted studies
regarding the air quality level, the court felt these guidelines failed to
articulate "intelligible principles,"'' 55 from which the EPA could properly
determine air quality standards. The court found that the EPA's newly
issued standards did not reflect congressional intent. 56 The court reasoned
that, "it [was] as though Congress commanded EPA to select [the] 'big
guys,' and EPA announced that it would evaluate candidates based on
height and weight, but revealed no cutoff point."' 57 The court stated that a
the Supreme Court voided a section of the National Industry Recovery Act ("NIRA") as violative
of the Non-Delegation Doctrine. Here, the petitioners were convicted of eighteen counts of
violating the Live Poultry Code, which was enforced pursuant to section 3 of the NIRA. Section 3
allowed the President to promulgate "codes of fair competition" and take other measures to
effectuate the broad goals set forth in section 1 of the NIRA. The petitioners argued that it was
unconstitutional because the President was restrained by no standards in exercising this power.
The Court relied on Panama Refining to determine the validity of the legislative delegation. The
Court explained that a legislative delegation must operate "within prescribed limits," and
emphasized that the statute which delegated power to the President failed to describe its subject,
beyond insuring fair competition. It held the delegation was unconstitutional because it failed to
set standards to guide the President in creating the codes of fair competition.).
149. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (stating that the provision that
gave the President unfettered authority to lay down prohibitions on transport on whatever grounds
he saw fit was unconstitutional).
150. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 1033.
152. Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
153. Id. § 7409(b)(2) (2000).
154. See id. § 7602(h) (2000).
155. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034.
156. See generally id.
157. Id. at 1034.
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reasonable person would also ask, "How tall? How heavy?"' 58 The case
shows that Congress upset the delicate balance of powers between the
branches of the government when it delegated policy-making power to a
federal agency, made up of unelected agency officials. 59 Concurring cases
state that Congress sheds its policy-making powers when it provides
virtually no guidelines to curtail an agency's discretion in implementing
legislation. 60 Thus, instead of working within the law, the EPA usurped
Congress' power by creating the standards and policy for the law without
regard to the original purposes for which Congress created them: "to
protect the public health."1 6' "[I]mportant choices of social policy are
made by Congress, the branch of... Government most responsive to the
popular will.' 62 However, decisions like this have been sadly unusual in
the history of agency regulation. 
163
The lesson learned from American Trucking is that absent clear
congressional parameters, an executive agency has enormous interpretive
and law-making powers. The FCC's powers lack precise congressional
constraints. For example, the FCC has been given unfettered authority to
regulate for the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."' 64 It is as if
Congress told the FCC to weed out the bad elements and regulate broadcast
with public sentiment in mind. Then, using regulatory orders, the FCC
announced that it will evaluate broadcasting content according to some
equally ambiguous indecency standard. However, the FCC has revealed no
cut-off point or concrete guidelines. A reasonable person would inquire
about the type of language that is appropriate, and ask questions such as,
"what words are bad?" and "how explicit?" There is just as much
ambiguity in the FCC's regulations as in the EPA's directives. However,
the EPA was forced to reissue its regulations while the FCC remains a wild
dog unleashed upon society.
Moreover, though this type of judicial deference might be acceptable
158. Id.
159. See generally id.
160. See Indus. Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
161. American Trucking, 175 F.3dat 1033.
162. Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 685.
163. The Supreme Court later overturned the Court of Appeals decision stating that it was
not a violation of the Non-Delegation Doctrine because it would be unrealistic to require
Congress to determine exact ozone levels that the EPA could regulate under. Instead, it deferred
to precedent, allowing the ambiguous language such as regulating for public necessity to stand as
an intelligible principle. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). But other
cases continue to suggest that impermissible delegations of power are taking place. See Michigan
v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 680 (1999).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
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at times when technology and culture require specialized agencies to pass
intricate laws affecting complex areas, the First Amendment is not a
product of the modem day technological boom. The same kind of loose
deference accorded to federal agencies should not apply to regulations
affecting the First Amendment or other constitutional areas. Arguably, the
EPA is truly in a better position than Congress to make environmental
regulations because the regulations require complex, scientific research to
determine such things as pollution levels in the air. Congress does not have
the time or the resources to conduct these research-based studies, while an
agency like the EPA exists primarily for its expertise in the environment.
Though complex in its own right, the First Amendment does not require the
same level of specialization that prompted the creation of the EPA so as to
justify Congress delegating its law-making ability in the area of
Constitutional law.
The right of free speech is an individual, fundamental right that has
existed since the inception of the country. The FCC cannot be given such
unconstrained guidelines on the false premise that it is better situated to
articulate what can and cannot be said on the air. Instead, Congress, a large
body comprised of elected public representatives, rather than the FCC, a
body of five appointed individuals, is truly in a better position to know and
define the contemporary community standards. Congress, as a
representative body, is more likely to be in tune with the issues that affect
speech, such as modem trends, morals, and tolerances of the public at
large. 165
Unlike rights to deplete ozone levels and to control the width of
trucks, 166 freedom of speech is a constitutional right revered since the
inception of the country. It is a right that the Constitution was specially
amended to protect through the Bill of Rights. 167 The First Amendment
was drafted as a reaction to the suppression of speech that existed in
English society and in the English press.1 68 Several purposes have been
proponed for the protection of free speech: (1) it is crucial to self-
governance and essential in a democratic society; (2) it leads to the
165. See Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306, 333 n.2 (1973) (Blackmun J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating "It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and
the voice, and to embody the wisdom and the will of its constituents.").
166. See generally South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (ruling that a
South Carolina statute excluding trucks from. operating on South Carolina roads if the trucks
exceeded a certain width was within the state legislature's power and was an acceptable burden
on interstate commerce.).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 895 (2001).
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discovery of truth; (3) it advances personal autonomy such that it allows
people to engage in self-definition and expression; and (4) it promotes
tolerance. 169 Many have articulated reasons for its importance in American
society, but perhaps Justice Brandeis said it best in his concurrence in
Whitney v. California, stating among other things that the framers,
"[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst
form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed."'' 70 Thus it is almost sacrilegious to liken the regulations of
speech to simple regulations based on interstate commerce affecting
various truck lengths.
Sadly, this is what the current FCC review system does-it likens
speech to truck lengths by allowing the agency to regulate speech using the
same "intelligible principles" given to federal agencies to regulate interstate
commerce. Thus, the Supreme Court should follow the lower courts and
previous Non-Delegation decisions and overturn FCC regulations, holding
the delegation to the FCC constitutionally impermissible. In addition, the
judiciary cannot operate under the current assumption that an agency is
truly in a better position than Congress to issue regulations; instead it must
take the deference given to the FCC out of the current "strict scrutiny"
review. The judiciary must insist that Congress step in to honor the history
and tradition of the U.S. Constitution, and protect rights like the First
Amendment, rather than delegating authority to the FCC. Broadcasters
would be more likely to succeed if they launched a constitutional challenge
based on the Non-Delegation Doctrine.
B. Revamping the FCC's Guidelines: The Legislative Solution
Launching an attack on FCC guidelines based on the Non-Delegation
Doctrine through the judicial system might be a novel strategy, and may
solve the problem by occasionally overturning some FCC regulations.
However, this "post-injury" solution seems inadequate, as it will neither
solve the underlying ambiguity problem nor ameliorate the chilling effect
on broadcasters' rights to free speech. Rather, an attack must aim at the
Congressional source, solving the problem proactively instead of
reactively.
Broadcasters would likely achieve more by lobbying for a
169. Id. at 898-902.
170. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
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Congressional amendment to the Telecommunications Act that would
provide for a bifurcated law-making process. With such an amendment,
Congress could create two methods of reviewing FCC and other agency
regulations. Regulations that do not affect constitutional rights would be
subject to the existing framework, so as not to disrupt the complex
regulatory system on which the modem government relies. However,
regulations affecting constitutional rights would be subject to a much more
rigorous review process, guided by genuine "intelligible principles."
Under the current system, regulations are passed, enforced, and then
challenged. This system creates a long, frustrating process that allows
regulations that merit strict scrutiny review to pass via a highly deferential
review that resembles the "toothless" rational basis review standard.' 7' The
FCC was created and given its regulatory authority pursuant to the
Telecommunications Act. 172 Thus, its law-making power was simply given
rational basis review, because, as a statute affecting Interstate Commerce,
the Telecommunications Act only merits this lowest standard. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that it will defer to the FCC's judgment in
the area of indecency because of indecency's "inherent vagueness."' 173 The
Court thus effectively permits the FCC to pass regulations affecting speech
without properly subjecting those regulations to strict scrutiny. As the
cases and language show above, in reality, the Court has elected to apply a
looser strict scrutiny approach; one so loose that it resembles the rational
basis standard.
The Telecommunications Act is only subject to rational basis review
by the courts because Congress is the body most responsible to the public.
The courts accord deference to Congress, because members of Congress
are elected representatives and presumably make decisions that sit well
with the public. 174 The Court makes it clear in Alexander v. Sandoval,
175
171. The Supreme Court adopted a rational basis review to examine laws passed by
Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Under this standard, the Court will uphold any law
that Congress passes if the purposes of the law are "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). This is the lowest
standard of review the Court can apply when examining statutes. Additionally, the Court has not
required that Congress state an actual, specific legislative purpose, but rather has allowed laws to
pass constitutional muster merely if the Court can fathom any rational purpose that Congress
might have had in mind when making the law. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955).
172. See 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000).
173. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
174. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995).
175. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (In this case, the plaintiff challenged the
defendant's policy of administering driver's license examinations only in English, arguing that it
had a discriminatory impact on Non-English speakers based on national origin. The U.S.
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that only Congress may create federal law and implied rights enforced
through federal law. 76  In contrast, federal agencies are left to issue
administrative interpretations of statutes passed by Congress that are only
supposed to "flesh out the contents of those rights.' 77  Additionally, the
Supreme Court assumes that Congress conducts legislative studies and thus
makes informed decisions to author legislation.
178
In contrast, the courts accord the least deference to Congress and
apply a strict scrutiny test to laws that affect constitutional rights, such as
the First Amendment. 79  This means that the government must have a
compelling governmental purpose for the law, and the law must be
narrowly tailored to fit that purpose.180 Thus, when laws are said to violate
fundamental rights, such as the right to free speech, they are subjected to
this strict scrutiny examination.' 8' Courts exercise extreme caution in
allowing Congress or any other body to regulate those rights, because the
rights are so highly valued.
The problem occurs when the application of the rational basis test is
disguised as the strict scrutiny test. Under the current system, the FCC
creates regulations affecting speech that deserve the strictest standard of
review. Instead, these regulations receive a highly deferential review that
resembles a rational basis review, because the judicial branch has been
according the amount of deference by referring to the Act under which the
FCC was created. However, the Court should be looking at the type of law
affected by the FCC regulation. Unlike Congress, The FCC is not
Supreme Court found no private right of action to enforce the regulations, as Title VI remedies
only dealt with intentional discrimination. The Court also held that the express language
permitting the implementation of regulations included no provision for implementation of private
rights.).
176. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that no agency regulation can create an individual right enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because only Congress has the power to create private rights of action).
177. Id. at 936 (holding that "because of controlling Supreme Court precedent... an agency
regulation cannot create [an] individual right...").
178. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 924-25 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Motts, J., dissenting) (explaining that the judiciary relies on congressional
findings in applying a rational basis review. Motts confirms the notion that the Supreme Court
affords rational basis review to laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause because the Court
has no congressional findings to refer to and thus has no reason to question Congress' purposes in
passing the law.); see also Arthur B. Mark, III, United States v. Morrison, The Commerce Clause
and the Substantial Effects Test: No Substantial Limit On Federal Power, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV.
675, 686 (2001).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Sable
Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
180. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
181. See id.; Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. at 126.
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responsible to the public: it is comprised of only five unelected individuals.
The FCC also has no restrictive measures in place-such as sunset clauses,
which Congress writes into laws to allow for their easy termination. The
courts do not accord deference to the agency, but rather to Congress, and in
turn, Congress delegates that deference to the agencies it creates. This shift
in deference is why agencies like the FCC should be given more guidelines
when regulating constitutional rights, and it is the cornerstone argument for
implementation of the proposed bifurcated review process.
Meanwhile, broadcasters are left to engage in self-censorship and face
enormous fines. This shift in deference may work for truck width
legislation, but it cannot be tolerated when it affects individuals'
constitutional rights. Congress has made it clear that the FCC is not to
censor broadcast waves. 182 Although the FCC may not be engaging in
black-letter censorship through prior restraint, what is the difference if the
agency's procedures of review cause the broadcasters to censor themselves
in order to avoid fines? Both paths lead in the same direction.
If Congress had stepped in from the beginning and had given the FCC
more guidelines about how to regulate this area affecting broadcasters'
First Amendment rights, these problems might have quickly been resolved.
At present, however, Congress could require the FCC to take a more
proactive stance when issuing regulations, and could give a clear and
thorough definition of indecency to broadcasters. Then broadcasters could
at least adhere to specific rules instead of guessing what the rules are and
paying large fees if they are mistaken.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCC orders that regulate broadcasting content and speech rights
have been controversial since their inception. As the administrative state
grows, the validity of the law-making process through which these
regulations are passed becomes more and more constitutionally unsound.
Because of the judicial branch's unwillingness to apply a true strict scrutiny
standard of review and because of its increasing deference to administrative
agencies, the legislative solution is the better one.
Unless broadcasters bring a novel constitutional challenge or
Congress imposes a new bifurcated law-making process, the FCC will
continue to terrorize the broadcast world with excessive fines and
ambiguity.' 83 A solution to this problem is urgent. Immobility in this area
182. See Seth T. Goldsamt, Comment, "Crucified by the FCC?" Howard Stern, the FCC,
and Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 203, 210 (1995).
183. See supra Parts 1, I.
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may lead to a permanent change in American communication systems and
the regrettable loss of important constitutional rights upon which the
United States was founded.
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